The transport message security provided by vehicles in VANETs is quite important; vehicle message should be real-time and it will be not complicated to validate message calculation. The method proposed in the essay is mainly to validate the identity by means of Bilinear Diffie-Hellman method, and make vehicles validate the authenticity of RSU and TA's identity and the effectiveness of key. RSU and TA only need to validate vehicle identity, without helping vehicles produce any key. When vehicle identity validation is completed, vehicles will produce public value and transmit it to other RSU and vehicles, while other vehicles could validate the identity through the message from the sender and public value from RSU. The advantages of the method proposed in this essay are listed as follows. (1) Vehicles, RSU, and TA can validate mutual identities and the effectiveness of keys. (2) Vehicles can produce public value functions automatically, thus reducing key control risks. (3) Vehicles do not need to show certificates to validate their identities, preventing the certificates from attacking because of long-term exposure. (4) Vehicles adopt a pseudonym ID challenge to validate their own identities during the process of handoff. (5) Vehicle messages can be validated using the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) method without waiting for the RSU to validate messages, thus improving the instantaneity of messaging. The method proposed in the essay can satisfy source authentication, message integrity, nonrepudiation, privacy, and conditional untraceability requirements.
Introduction
Especially VANET receives special attention in terms of traffic security and traffic management [1, 2] . In order to reach the demand of vehicle security, vehicles often broadcast traffic related message among themselves (vehicle position, speed, traffic accidents, and so on) and other services [3] , which could reduce traffic jams and dangerous road sections and improve the driving security. VANET usually has two message transmission modes: (1) message broadcast mode, through which vehicles could make other vehicles nearby know the traffic condition in the neighborhood; (2) one hop message transmission, through which vehicles could transmit message to the designated vehicle and which is mainly used for private communication among vehicles.
The essay mainly investigates message security and integral security system layout in VANET, which aims at vehicles' safety on road. Each vehicle could use broadcast mode and inform other vehicles of the traffic condition nearby, so as to avoid traffic jam and improve driving efficiency. They could also use private communication and RSU or TA (trusted authority) for updating. Assume this message was maliciously attacked or forged, it would cause vehicle collision or traffic jam; so message integrity and source authentication is the important key.
The method proposed in the essay is based on RSU. Suppose that each main road was provided with RSU and secondary roads were not. In the whole system framework, TA utilizes Bilinear Diffie-Hellman to generate public/private key and other parameters of its own and RSU, where the effective time of key is added, so TA and RSU is forced to change key regularly and improve system security and all vehicles could validate the legality of RSU through public key and other parameters of RSU and by means of Bilinear DiffieHellman.
We adopt two-level pseudonym method; that is to say, vehicles have the first-level pseudonym ID in TA and the second-level pseudonym ID in RSU. There is no relationship between the two levels of pseudonym ID in terms of original generation modes, which avoids RSU maliciously conspiring and tracing vehicles. TA and RSU are only responsible for validating vehicle identity, not for the vehicle broadcast message. After the identity authentication of vehicles and RSU, vehicles would transmit public value to RSU, which will then send the public value to each RSU and vehicle, so when a vehicle is broadcasting message, all vehicles could validate the message integrity through the method of Bilinear DiffieHellman, without using RSU. Meanwhile, the calculation of Bilinear Diffie-Hellman signatures is not very complicated and the key of Bilinear Diffie-Hellman signatures for vehicles is different each time, so it is unable to get forged and attacked.
During the process of handoff, vehicles adopt pseudonym ID challenge method to validate their own identities, which only need communicate pseudonym generation mode with the next RSU. As only vehicles and RSU know the pseudonym generation mode, if the challenge is successful, the identities could be validated mutually, so as to reduce the identity validation time when vehicles are handoff. Meanwhile, vehicles have different public values and pseudonym ID in each RSU.
Related Works
Public key infrastructure (PKI) method is used in [9] . Suppose that TA issues certificates; each vehicle has private key and certificates have public key relative to private key; when vehicle a is about to communicate with another vehicle b, a will use the public key in b's certificates to encrypt the message, then a transmits the encrypted message to b, and b decrypts the message through private key. As the certificates are issued by TA, so they are reliable. Provided that b could decrypt the message, the message integrity could be confirmed. Vehicles utilizing PKI for message encrypting and decrypting would improve the calculation complexity and bring great calculation burden during the communication process. In order to protect privacy and not to be traced, certificates must be changed frequently, which will cause burden on TA.
A dynamic privacy-preserving key management scheme for location-based services in VANETs was proposed in [4] . This scheme ensures the anonymous authentication of a vehicle and enables double-registration detection. In addition, each vehicle can use a one-way hash function to update the vehicles new session key. However, the computations for message signature and verification presented in [4] are complicated, and the author did not investigate a private communication scheme.
In [5] , when vehicles are able to get some network access services from RSU, they must broadcast a message and establish common key with vehicles receiving the message, and then this common key could be utilized to guarantee the security while communicating the message. However, the establishment of common key is got through pairing computation of identity-based cryptography (IBC) [10] , whose calculation is much more complicated than normal computation, and the calculation burden is quite great. The essay does not discuss the problems when vehicles rekey or change pseudonym ID, which is quite important to VANETs, so it is necessary to propose the solutions.
In [6] , an elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) was used for message authentication. The current position information is used together with the ECDSA for signing messages from anonymous IDs. Other vehicles do not require a third-party public key certificate for message authentication. However, the authors did not discuss the problems of rekeying and private communication.
The literature [7] proposed that a driver can check the status of a road through VANET, the transmission process that utilizes bilinear technology to ensure information security and vehicle privacy. Either a vehicle or an RSU must have identity verification with TA and related key generation. Identity verification utilizes bilinear technology to ensure information security and nonrepudiation. Traditional asymmetric encryption, symmetric encryption, and signature are used for messaging of any unit (vehicle, RSU, or TA). In the literature [7] TA must constantly change the master secret key of a vehicle or RSU, which results in a heavy computational load of TA, and the messaging using asymmetric encryption will cause the same problem during decryption.
The literature [8] proposed message batch verification and group message signing and verification for vehicle privacy and information security. Vehicles form a group and each group has a related key for message encryption and decryption. Because the message is sent by a group, it cannot be traced back to a specific vehicle. If a vehicle in the group sends a malicious message, however, it may also be difficult to track down and batch verification will delay real-time messaging.
The literature [11] primarily involves group message signing improvement. This paper has improved the group message signing performance, but has not discussed private communications between vehicles or the replacement of relevant vehicle parameters. A vehicle is vulnerable to tracking if the relevant parameters are not replaced regularly.
Background

Bilinear Pairings and Hard
Problems. Let 1 and 2 denote an additive and a multiplicative group, and both of them are with prime order . Let be generator of 1 , and let : 1 × 1 → 2 be a bilinear mapping with the following properties.
(1) Bilinear:
Mathematical Problems in Engineering 3 (2) Nondegeneracy: ∃ ∈ 1 such that̂( , ) ̸ = 1. That is, the mapping does not send all pairs in 1 × 1 to the identity in 2 .
(3) Computable: there exists an efficient algorithm to compute ( , ) for all ∈ 1 .
The bilinear map can be implemented using the Weil [12] and Tate [13] pairings on elliptic curves. We consider the implementation of a Tate pairing on a Miyaji-NakabayashiTakano (MNT) curve [14] with embedding degree 6, where 1 is represented by 161 bits and the order is represented by 160 bits.
The following part will define and specify various relevant mathematical problems [15] which will be applied in the essay subsequently.
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Problem. Given ( , , , ) ∈ 1 , where , , ∈ * , compute = ( , ) .
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP).
Given two elements , ∈ 1 , find an integer ∈ * , such that = .
Boneh and Franklin's ID-Based Encryption.
We use Boneh and Franklin's ID-Based Encryption [13] to encrypt and decrypt message. Let be the system security parameter. Then PKG selects two groups 1 and 2 of prime order q, a bilinear mapping = 1 × 1 → 2 , and a generator of group 1 . PKG also picks a random number ∈ * as its master key and then selects two distinct hash functions:
* . At last, PKG publishes the system parameters ( , 1 , 2 , , , 1 , 2 ) and keeps secretly.
Assume there are two users and . User utilizes the public key of User to encrypt message ; the identity of User is ID ∈ {0, 1} * , with the public key, private key, and data key being PU = 1 (ID ), PR = ⋅ 1 (ID ), and PD = ⋅ , respectively, and User selects random number ∈ * randomly. The message encryption process is as follows:
where = { , } is the encrypted message, User sends the encrypted message to User , and then User utilizes private key for decryption and works out message after receiving the message, with the calculation as follows: 
When other users receive , , and , they can utilize the public key and public parameter of User to validate signatures, and the signature validation calculation is as follows:
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Messages Authentication.
The essay applies the features of bilinear pairings hard problems [15] . Though the calculation time increases, it is acceptable if the calculation is reasonable. The method we propose assumes that users select two random numbers and at random, where = 1/ 4 ( ‖ stamp ); then we calculate public value as follows: = * * .
Next, we apply them to bilinear pairings, with the calculation as follows:
= ( ⋅ , ⋅ ⋅ ) = ( , ) .
If users release message , they will first work out , , and through formula (6) and then issue ( , ⋅ , ⋅ , ) to other users. Other users could validate source and message integrity through formula (8) . We utilize hard problems to validate the method's security. (1) According to ECDLP, we publish ( , ⋅ , ⋅ , ) and other users cannot get from = ( , ) and know and from ⋅ and ⋅ , so users cannot forge message maliciously; (2) according to BDH and ( ⋅ , * ⋅ ) = ( , ) , DBDHP feature is utilized to validate message integrity, as shown in formula (8).
Proposed Scheme
This chapter would introduce the methods proposed in the essay. Section 4.2 introduces the system installation for the methods in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 introduces registration of vehicles and RSU, creation of vehicles and RSU related tables, and how vehicles carry out handoff at different RSU regions. one TA and TA is the legally binding unit mechanism and in charge of controlling the whole network's security, which will provide the real identities of malicious nodes for legal prosecution when malicious nodes attack. On the one hand, the role of TA takes charge of validating vehicles or RSU's identities and on the other hand RSU and relevant coefficients are set by TA and RSU is set up on some common traffic facilities, such as traffic lights. TA and RSU are provided with wire/wireless communication. The communication between TA and RSU adopts wire communication, such as backbone. TA, RSU, and vehicles use short distance wireless communication equipment and the communication between RSU and vehicles adopts wireless communication. The parameters used in the method are described in the Notation section.
System Initialization.
The section introduces the system installation of TA, RSU, and vehicles, which need not any certificates and could validate their own identities only by BDH messages authentication. Meanwhile, key sets the effective time, whose effectiveness could be validated any time. (2) The calculation public value ( ID TA, ) is as follows:
TA System
ID TA, (1) TA selects ID , ∈ * as the master key of private communication.
(2) Calculate private communication key of to be ( ⋅ + , ⋅ , ) and (PU ID , ⋅ + ID , ⋅ , ).
(3) Calculate public key, private key, and other parameters of as follows:
where
is the real ID of RSU.
(4) Set public key PU , = 1 (ID , ).
(5) Set private key PR = ID TA, ⋅ PU , .
(6) Set data key PD , = ID TA, .
TA would create a table to record RSU's ID, key's valid time, being legal or not, and RSU's common key, with the calculation method for common key proposed in Section 4.4.3.
TA will not give any certificates and it can validate the identity only by BDH messages authentication. Meanwhile, each RSU's key has valid time and it could be known whether key is within the valid time only from the identity validation. Any unit could validate RSU or TA's legitimacy through the following formula, with the calculation as follows:
where represents TA or any one RSU. 
(3) Vehicle utilizes TA's public key to encrypt message and transmit it to TA, with the calculation as follows:
, and transmits the encrypted message to TA, with the calculation as follows:
TA would validate 's first-level pseudonym ID (ID , ) and then public value, as shown in the following formula:
Message Broadcast and Message Authentication in RSU.
When a vehicle enters RSU region, the vehicle would first check if RID 
Registration.
Suppose that when the vehicle enters region and has not created public value related functions and identity validation with , then would utilize TA to validate its own identity, so RSU could believe in the secondlevel pseudonym ID and public value of . Two ways could be adopted for TA to validate vehicle's identities: (1) challenge of vehicles' pseudonym ID; (2) validation of public value. The challenge of vehicles' pseudonym ID could be adopted for RSU validating vehicles' identities, with the calculation as follows.
(1) The calculation of vehicles validating TA identity:
(1.1) the vehicle selects ∈ * ;
(1.2) the vehicle recalculates the first-level pseudonym ID as follows:
combines the arithmetic result after experiencing times of hash with ID TA, and then goes through one hash arithmetic to produce the first-level pseudonym ID (ID , ). 
, (19) where ID , is the random number selected by ; would sign public value, pseudonym ID, and key's validness of the vehicles within the range at the fixed time and transmit the signature to each vehicle within the range. The signature is Sign , = (ID , ‖ ID , ‖Tl ID , ‖ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ‖ID , ‖ ID , ‖ stamp ), so each vehicle only needs to validate the signature after receiving the signature message and then the public value of each vehicle could be known, with the calculation of signature validation as follows:
Each vehicle would store the message in the vehicle message table (see Table 1 ).
During the process, only and TA know ID , and RSU cannot know ID , , so pseudonym and privacy could be attained. After knowing ID , , TA could validate 's identity. If is a legal vehicle, RSU would also accept 's second-level initializing pseudonym ID and public value and assist to create RID-key table. Table 2 ) and vehicle message table (see Table 1 ); RID-key table is for storing public value and relevant parameters which vehicles establish for RSU and vehicle message table is for storing public value and relevant parameters of other vehicles. Each RSU has SPID-key for storing vehicles' public value and relevant parameters and RSU message table (see Table 3 ) is used for storing the key of private communication between RSU and relevant parameters.
4.3.2.
After the vehicle and create public value and relevant parameters, begins to produce public value and pseudonym ID close to RSU, with the calculation as follows.
(1) selects ∈ * at random.
(2) Calculate each RSU's pseudonym ID as follows:
ID , = (reg‖ID ) . After receiving the encrypted message of , would calculate the common key with and only and know the common key, so the message source and integrity could be confirmed. Then, after decrypting message , would encrypt individual public value, pseudonym ID and random numbers of , and each RSU and transmit them to each RSU. Each RSU receives the message and stores 's public value, pseudonym ID, and random numbers in SPID table, as shown in Table 4 . Meanwhile, each RSU would calculate 's pseudonym ID, as shown in formula (18) and would also report illegal RSU and valid time close to RSU to the vehicle , so as to avoid malicious attack. 
Use ID , = as the symmetrical encryption and transmit private communication key and signature to .
Only and know . If the message could be unlocked and represent itself, the identities of both sides could be validated by means of pseudonym ID challenge. If it is validated correctly, would periodically broadcast 's pseudonym ID, public value, and validity by means of signature. 
Message Transmission and
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Message Transmission and Validation within RSU Range.
When is about to broadcast one message within communication range, would perform the calculation as follows:
would broadcast ID , ⋅ , ID , , ID , ⋅ , stamp , and to the vehicles within the communication range. After receiving the message, other vehicles would check if there is ID , 's public value in their own vehicle message table and if they know 's public value, they could validate the message source and integrity through formula (24).
Assuming that after vehicle receives a message from , can judge whether message is correct. As the public value of ( ( , ) ID , ) is public, then can determine whether ID , ⋅ , ID , , ID , ⋅ , stamp , and are the message sent by . First calculate 1/ 4 (ID , ‖ ‖ stamp ) and then calculate whether
ID , is correct. If it is correct, it indicates that the message is issued by ; otherwise it will be discarded. Since only knows ID , and ( , )
ID , is a problem, it cannot be forged by other vehicles.
Communication between Different RSUs. Two vehicles cannot communicate with each other between different
RSUs; the reason lies in that the vehicle's public value and pseudonym ID are different in different RSUs and vehicles' public value in each RSU cannot be known between RSUs. Therefore, it is unable to assist vehicles to validate the correctness of the message transmitted from other RSUs. As shown in Figure 2 , and are and , respectively, in two different RSUs. When broadcasts a message to , though receives the message, it does not know if public value is owned by itself and it cannot confirm if it is the legal user. In order to resolve the above problem, as shown in Figure 3, (1) first transmits the message to , the message content is request message: ‖ID , ‖ stamp , and informs us within different RSUs; (2) after the successful entry of identity validation, transmits one signature to and the signature is Sign → = ( ‖ ‖ ), where
would broadcast signatures to , then could know 's public key and public parameters and validate signatures and 's validity. After the success of validation, could know 's public value and validate the message source and integrity.
Private Communication.
In the following part we will discuss five cases of private communication: Case 1: private communication between TA and RSU, Case 2: private 
Next, TA calculates the private communication with as follows:
where PU ID TA, = 1 (ID TA ), PU ID , = 1 (ID ); as ID is public, it could be calculated by itself. Therefore, the common key in formulae (25) and (26) 
where PU ID , = 1 (ID , ), PU ID , = 1 (ID , ); it could be known that the private communication key is the same from the final results.
Case 3. Suppose wants to perform private communication with . First, and will validate each other's identities and key's validity and would calculate the private communication with as follows:
Next, calculates the private communication with as follows:
where PU ID , = 1 (ID , ) and PU ID , = 1 (ID , ) and it could be known that the private communication key is the same from the final results.
Case 4. Suppose wants to perform private communication with . First, and will validate each other's identities and key's validity and would calculate the private communication with as follows:
where PU ID , = 1 (ID , ) and PU ID , = 1 (ID , ); it could be known from the final results that the private communication key is the same. 
where PU ID , = 1 (ID , ) and PU ID TA, = 1 (ID TA, ) and it could be known from the final results that the private communication key is the same.
From Case 1 to Case 5, it could be known that private communication could be performed among vehicles, RSU or TA, and the private communication key of any vehicle and RSU has the top secrets and their own secrets, so it is impossible to forge any vehicle or RSU, as you must know the top secrets.
Though the private communication method costs much more calculation time for the first time, which is spent in validating the other's identity and calculating the private communication key between them, the calculation time during the communication within the other's valid time is much less, as the common secret key has already been established, which will not be recalculated until the other's valid time expires. For the symmetrical encryption, the calculation time is less. For the equipment which often uses private communication, such as RSU to RSU or RSU to TA, the time which private communication spends could be reduced. Suppose is a malicious node; adjacent would directly utilize the common key with TA to encrypt the message and inform TA that is a malicious node. TA would first validate if is a malicious node. If it is, TA would set 's legality in table false and use the common key with RSU to inform all RSUs that is a malicious node, so that malicious RSU or vehicles updating KEY or communication subsequently would be stopped.
Key Updating and Identity
Security and Performance Analysis
This section mainly illustrates that the method proposed in the essay could reach (1) message source, (2) message integrity, (3) nonrepudiation, (4) pseudonym, and (5) untraceability, in terms of security analysis. As far as the performance analysis is concerned, we carry out performance analysis in [4] [5] [6] (Table 7) .
Security Analysis.
We discuss the security analysis from 5 aspects as follows. (5) Privacy. The essay adopts two-level pseudonym ID. The first level is the pseudonym ID between vehicle and TA, which is known to only TA and vehicle and not broadcasted to RSU or vehicles. The second-level pseudonym ID is produced by RSU and vehicle. Suppose RSU traces vehicles' travel path by means of collusion attack and the trace time and range are limited, as after the time slice, vehicles will be revalidated by TA and replace the first-level and second-level pseudonym ID, then the pseudonym ID produces irregularity, so the vehicles' privacy could be improved.
Performance Analysis.
In this section, we compare our method with [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . Table 5 shows the differences and we could know that our method has a lot of advantages from the table.
In Table 6 , we propose encryption/decryption calculation time. According to [17, 18] , the implementation of the bilinear mapping is provided based on the Tate pairing over a MiyajiNakabayashi-Takano (MNT) curve [19] with embedding degree 6 and 160-bit .
We utilize Table 6 , to calculate the time for broadcasting messages and validating messages in [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . The method proposed in the essay supposes that if a vehicle is about to broadcast messages to other vehicles within the range, the vehicle would calculate ID , = ID , * (1/ 4 (ID , * * stamp )) * ID , . As these calculations belong to the general integer calculation, whose calculation complexity is quite low, and the vehicle will change ID , and ID , into points, 2 * calculation time will be spent. The vehicle will broadcast the following messages to other vehicles ( ‖ ID , ‖ ID , ‖ID , ‖ stamp ) and then calculate the message validation time. After receiving messages, other vehicles could first inquire about the vehicle's public value and the validation is ( , )
, so the time for broadcasting and validating messages in the essay is + . During the handoff process of vehicles in the essay, when RSU's pseudonym ID challenge is successful, RSU would assist vehicles to produce signature time, as shown in formula (4), which needs 3 * in all. RSU produces vehicles' private communication key, as shown in formula (21), which needs 4 * +3 * , so the total time is 7 * +3 * . When messages are broadcast to other vehicles within different RSUs, vehicles producing message signatures need 2 * , other vehicles validating signatures, as shown in formula (22), and need + , and validating vehicles' message needs + , so the total time required is 4 * + 2 * . References [4, 6] both use certificates to validate their own identities, so the broadcasting messages could validate their own identities within RSU range or outside RSU range. In [5] , the concept of identity-based is utilized and vehicles establish common key with each vehicle, so when vehicles broadcast messages, they would utilize the common key with each vehicle as HMAC's key and encrypt messages and then transmit the encrypted message to the other side, as broadcasting messages requires establishing common keys to encrypt messages and other vehicles also need establish common keys for decryption, so there is 2 * altogether. As [5] does not discuss the communication between vehicles at different RSUs, it is unable to calculate the encryption and decryption time.
Conclusion
The method in the essay adopts BDH messages authentication to produce TA and RSU's public key and other parameters. Any vehicles could validate if RSU is legal through BDH messages authentication method and utilize pseudonym ID challenge method to validate RSU and vehicles' identities, which quickens handoff processing time.
It is hoped that message batch validation and how to judge vehicles are malicious nodes will be added. Though the essay proposes cancellation of users' function, it does not mention how to judge users to be malicious nodes, which will be put into the study and make the study more complete.
Notation
:
B i l i n e a rm a p p i n g Lifetime of the corresponding parameters ‖:
The message concatenation operation, which appends several messages together in a special format.
